and the human body and reading textual production and social practice as jointly constitutive of matters of fact provides one possible model for rewriting the history of the Enlightenment and enlightened science and medicine in North America.7 In the story told here, useful knowledge and common sense are not ideas, in the conventional sense, defining the meaning of the Tractors; they are ideals of knowledge production for the American Republic that were made to flow from them, ideologically prescribed in specific regimes of bodily management. Approaching the history of natural knowledge and its uses in this way may profitably serve Bray's useful knowledge, characteristically for the early modern period, was both religious and secular: texts in history, classics, the sciences, and theology all commingled in the more than thirty thousand volumes he had shipped across the Atlantic. A similar fusion of Christian and secular concerns-improving the lot of human beings as a way to please God-has often been located in historical genealogies of modern science as useful knowledge, particularly in the writings of Francis Bacon, as the South Carolina physician and historian David Ramsay noted in an address on the history of medicine in 80oi. Within programs for enlightenment, the notion of utility could accommodate a variety of meanings. In the industrializing and internationally competitive era of the late eighteenth century, however, useful knowledge increasingly came to be understood in material rather than spiritual terms. The complementary relationship between American and British views is well symbolized by the role played by Benjamin Thompson of Massachusetts, later Count Rumford in his European incarnation, in founding the Royal Institution in London during 1799-I800. According to its charter, this was to be "a public institution for diffusing the knowledge and facilitating the general introduction of useful mechanical inventions and improvements," promoting "the application of science to the common purposes of life." Benjamin Franklin had used the same language of practical improvement half a century earlier in Philadelphia to call for the organization of the American Philosophical Society "for promoting useful knowledge among the British Plantations of America," based on the model of the Royal Society of London. Unsurprisingly, when pro-Independence writers celebrated Franklin as a national genius in the American Revolution, they emphasized the lightning rod as an incarnation of the practical utility and social benevolence of his electrical experiments.9
But material utilitarianism also created obstacles to the progress of science in the early American Republic. In the first place, the United States lacked the powerful aristocratic educational and state patrons who had proven indispensable to the development of science in early modern Europe, nurturing instead antipathy toward aristocracy and political centralization. In the late eighteenth century, while France and Britain were industrializing and forging ever-closer links between the practical applications of science and the prestige and health of state and empire, the leading citizens of the United States were debating whether the 
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Republic should even aspire to become a major manufacturing power. Thomas Jefferson, president of the United States and the American Philosophical Society after 80oi, best embodies the political paradox of early republican science: the nation's preeminent philosophe also embodied a political persuasion that favored a decentralized republic of agrarian yeomen over centralization, credit economies, urbanization, and large-scale manufacturing. In an era when whig narratives of liberty and cultural genius depicted the achievements of Isaac Newton in natural philosophy as born of the peculiarly English crucible of Protestantism and constitutional government, David Hume could confidently assert that "the only proper Nursery of [such] noble plants [is] a free state . .. and that a republic is most favourable to the growth of the sciences." Hume seems not to have anticipated the kind of challenge that postRevolutionary republicanism posed to science in the United States by denying it its traditional sources of support. Natural history, as provincial self-description or national self-celebration, thus became the most recognizable scientific idiom in the early Republic. It was more prominent than natural philosophy, which aspires to speak with global authority about physical causation and to practical application through mechanics (although, by the Jacksonian period if not before, the Republic became rife with engineering projects applying postNewtonian mechanics to projects of technological "improvement" in the states). As Alexis de Tocqueville was to suggest from the vantage point of the I83os, science without obvious application appeared to strike the mass of Americans as worthless.10
Science was also ideologically vulnerable in the late Enlightenment. During the French Revolution, especially in the Anglophone world, science became associated with amoral instrumentalism, atheism, and radicalism, most famously in Edmund Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in 
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France (1790), where chemical metaphors helped to conjure political revolution in the specter of a murderous enthusiasm. Conservative commentators in the United States followed Burke's lead. Joseph Dennie, editor of the Federalist Port Folio after I80I, cast moral aspersions on the intellectualism of the new Democratic-Republican president, labeling Jefferson a "cool-headed philosopher." (Rather than the abstract rationalist political enemies liked to depict, Jefferson was, in fact, an archempiricist whose faith in the evidence of the senses later moved him to modify Descartes's rationalist "I think, therefore I am" to the sensationalist "I feel, therefore I exist.")1l Early modern English narratives arguing that gentlemanly civility provided a social and moral foundation for natural philosophers to speak with public authority about matters of fact do not automatically apply to the early United States. As Dennie's attacks show, American gentlemen like Jefferson were exposed to politicized rhetorics of anti-intellectualism, licensed both by American republicanism and fear of French Jacobinism. "Although there are no nobles in America," wrote the French minister Louis Otto in I8o6, "there is a class of men denominated 'gentlemen,' who by reason of their wealth, their talents, their education, their families, or the offices they hold, aspire to a preeminence which the people refuse to grant them." Genius itself appeared suspect. According to Benjamin Latrobe, a British engineer who moved to Pennsylvania in 1796, the United States was an antiscientific culture. "The want of learning and of science in the majority is one of those things which strikes foreigners who visit us very forceably," Latrobe wrote. "Superior talents actually excite distrust, and the experience of the world perhaps does not encourage the people to trust men of genius." In an era of incipient specialization, 
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As with useful knowledge, a variety of meanings attached to early modern invocations of common sense, a notion whose paradoxical complexity derives from its aspiration to universalize and naturalize that which is local and conventional. In the Anglophone eighteenth century, common sense featured as the centerpiece of three distinct though not unrelated discourses: social, political, and epistemological. The exemplar of social common sense was Anthony Ashley Cooper, third earl of Shaftesbury. In Sensus Communis: An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour (1709), decisively influential in the age of genteel clubbability, Shaftesbury used common sense to describe the sympathetic social feelings that united gentlemen as a community of sociable beings, bound together by free enjoyment of the pleasures of wit and raillery. First and foremost, Shaftsburyean common sense emphasized the naturalness of social affections and civil commonality between men, a theme that was to figure prominently in the "moral sense" tradition articulated in the Scottish Enlightenment by Francis Hutcheson, Adam Smith, and others and that became a prominent feature of both moderate Protestant sermons and college curricula in North America during the second half of the century. In the words of the indomitable clubber and historian of the Tuesday Club of Annapolis, Dr. Alexander Hamilton (alias Loquacious Scribble), "there exists a certain affection or fellow feeling, between all bodies in nature, by which they have a strong tendency, to approach, one towards another, to Join." Fellow feeling was the physiological medium of sociability: "There is some very Subtile Effluvium, or Aura, that goes from one member to another, and Communicates a titulation [sic] Shaftesbury also discussed common sense's second connotation, that of the moral reliability of sound practical judgment (even though, as the epigraph to this article shows, he was keenly aware of its limits).14 The political implications of invoking the reliability of the judgment of the public were made clear in the American Revolution, where the practical judgment of a sovereign people figured as both the motor and moral justification for the rejection of British parliamentary authority and the creation of the American Republic. In the novus ordo seclorum envisioned by the Declaration of Independence, legitimate governments now derived their authority, not from custom, but "the consent of the governed" and were called upon to submit the "facts" justifying their existence to "a candid world." In Common Sense (1776), British radical Thomas Paine deliberately fashioned his prose to embody the political self-evidence of the new Republic. Arguing for freedom from the anachronistic opacities of imperial government, he explained, "I offer nothing more than simple facts, plain arguments, and common sense." Regard for lay practical judgment and plainspeaking was not, of course, an American innovation; neither was the public to whom Paine and the other founders appealed a democratic or universal one, carefully limited in conception as it was to propertied gentlemen. Nevertheless, by comparison with European governments under the ancien regime, Revolutionary American commitments to written constitutions subject to public scrutiny placed an unprecedented formal emphasis on the role of lay judgment in public life. "Equality," Tocqueville later reflected, "stimulates each man to want to judge everything for himself." Democratic peoples "mistrust systems and like to stick very close to the facts and study them for themselves."15 Third, common sense was part of an epistemological discourse that became linked in the Enlightenment to reaffirmations of the capacity of ordinary human beings to make reliable judgments about natural phenomena in the face of radical skepticism. Since Aristotle, philosophers had spoken of the sensorium commune as that faculty of mind that integrated the evidence of the five senses into a pattern intelligible to human beings. By the eighteenth century, leading physiologists such as Albrecht von Haller and Charles Bonnet believed the operation of such a faculty 14 In formal moral philosophy, this tradition is sometimes referred to as "common sense ethics" and is related to the common sense epistemology articulated by Thomas Reid and others (see below). was in effect a practical intervention in continuing debates about both useful knowledge and common sense (in its epistemological and political rather than social modes), enacting and urging its own relationship between the two. In this relationship, reliable knowledge of the facts of cause and effect in Tractoration was seen to reside in the sensory evidence and practical judgment of lay consumers of useful medical technology, rather than in academically trained physicians or natural philosophers. In other words, notions of common sense were mobilized to establish Tractoration as useful knowledge independent of philosophical understanding. As Shaftesbury had suggested, however, one man's common sense often proved another's delusion; one man's utility, another's imposition. 
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harmonica, and the organization of "crisis" rooms with mattresses onto which patients could comfortably swoon. Through its discourse of channeling animal magnetic fluids, Mesmerism also claimed to explain the invisibly related workings of body and cosmos.20
Next to the "ridiculous" practice of Mesmerism, Tractoration appeared a far less performative affair, billed as an external treatment only, where small metal rods rather than human hands intervened in the animal economy, but without making falsifiable claims to causal physiological explanation, inviting instead merely visual verification of effects through self-evident bodily response. "The knowledge, which may authorise us to speak on effects produced by an external application," wrote Benjamin Perkins, "is very unlike that which would be necessary, where internal remedies are used." "Good eyes, in a character uninfluenced by prejudice, or interest, may give testimony respecting the change observable in an inflammation or a tumefaction, on an application of the Tractors, which is more satisfactory than all the medical knowledge in the universe, without those requisites." Useful facts derived from the senses formed the "solid basis" of Perkinism. "I flatter myself," Benjamin Perkins confided to his readers, wearing his empiricism on his sleeve, that "I shall have the satisfaction, on being favoured with suitable subjects, of affording evidence, which to every person must be more satisfactory than any testimony, viz. the evidence of the senses. Instruments (1797), Pierpont Edwards, federal district attorney in New Haven, reported the case of a neighbor of his named Mrs. Beers who had been so distressed by her rheumatism that "she had not been able to walk across her room even with crutches." She "procured a set of your Metallic Substances, and in less than an hour after she had begun to use them, in the manner directed by you," she rose from her chair and walked about the house, and "on the next day she went abroad to her neighbors, having thrown aside her crutches." "She is," Edwards concluded, "in a fair way to be restored to perfect health." "It is a duty," he insisted, "you owe yourself and the world, to promulge this event." In a similar account from the same year, the Reverend Elhanan Winchester testified to seeing the "Metallic Tractors tried with success, upon several patients in the Alms or Bettering house in Philadelphia, especially upon a man who was unable to lift his right-hand to his head . . . but who in a few minutes, was able to move it at pleasure." All those whom Winchester witnessed receive the treatment agreed that they had been successfully cured, and he pledged his unswerving gratitude to the Dr. Munson being again called, pronounced his case a hazardous one; after having prescribed what he thought proper, suggested a trial of your Tractors. This I immediately undertook, and in about half an hour he declared the pain was gone, turned himself without difficulty on his right side, and fell into a profound sleep. .... he awoke in perfect health, and has continued so to this day.... I cannot tell why the waters of Jordan should be better than Abana and Pharpar, rivers of Damascus, yet since experience has proved them so, no reasoning can change the opinion. Indeed, the causes of all common facts are, we think, perfectly well known to us, and it is very probable that fifty or an hundred years hence, we shall as well know why your Tractors should in a few minutes remove violent pains, as we now know why cantharides and opium produce opposite effects; viz. we shall know but very little about either, excepting facts.
In his testimonial, Meigs swore to the effectiveness of the treatment without either describing his method or invoking any physical process to explain its effects. Perkinist prose allowed the reader to witness the "fact" of the body's responsiveness to Tractoration, but little more. Tractoration was useful even though it occasioned no knowledge claims as such.23
In both America and Britain, Perkinists effectively pitted the common sense of the public against the trustworthiness of academically trained physicians. Charles Langworthy, a surgeon who acted as the Perkinist agent in Bath, expressly addressed his promotional writing "to the publick, and have of course chosen to write it in a popular way, without applying the technical language of the profession, where it was possible to avoid it." Langworthy went on: "It is not to display myself that I write, but in the language of simplicity to convey my subject 'home to the business and bosoms' of the illiterate and the afflicted, as well as to the philanthropist, the philosopher, and the physician." It did not matter that the cause remained unknown, since the good effects of the treatment were self-evident. The causes underlying the effects of magnetism, opium, and the Peruvian Bark were also obscure, but their efficacy was scarcely ques- Perkinism did not seek to persuade its public through elaborate rhetoric or conspicuous theatrical display, the traditional strategies associated with unorthodox healers. That is, Perkinists were neither charismatic "charlatans" (loquacious verbal deceivers) nor "mountebanks" (itinerant doctors who literally mounted stages publicly to display their wares), traditionally understood. Rather, as the product of and a product for a culture committed to anti-theatrical republican transparency, and, hence, the superior morality of common sense and useful facts, Perkinism employed a form of "natural theatricality": the art of making nature appear to speak for itself. The moral and epistemological credibility of Perkinism resided, not in the social status of its supporters or any institutional affiliation, but, rather, in a depersonalized material object (the Tractors) amenable to universal manipulation. Such a strategy resonated with the morality of depersonalizing the public sphere in the age of republican revolution. Whereas the "charlatan wanted to be seen," the Perkinist aimed "not to display [himself]," in Langworthy's words-it was, to recall Paine's Common Sense, the instrument rather than its advocate that deserved public attention. Rejecting the conspicuous performance and controversial natural-philosophical engagement of animal magnetism, Perkinism aimed to display, not itself, but merely the bodily effects of the Tractors. Charles Wilkinson, a hostile British critic, drew a particularly illuminating distinction between the two therapies in In lieu of conspicuous performance or methodological secrecy, inscription became an important strategy for controlling the marketing and use of Tractors. According to critics, Tractors were simply expensive pieces of metal. Legal inscription thus helped to justify the cost of the therapy, which was higher than conventional electrotherapies. Dr. T. Gale, in some ways a more conventional medicoelectrician in New York State, claimed that readers of his handbook on electrotherapy (the first to be published in North America, in I802) could build their own electrical machines for only two to three dollars, following his instructions. Gale advocated using the Tractors in one instance but was deeply skeptical of the electrical status of Tractoration, suggesting that "perhaps a pair of steel-pointed scissors would answer the same purpose." Tractors, Gale concluded, appeared to work through mechanical frictional stimulus or the imagination.36 Legal inscription also guarded against counterfeit reproduction by drawing on the patent system then taking shape in the industrial revolution and thereby establishing claims to the Tractors' legal originality. Elisha Perkins had been expelled from the Connecticut Medical Society in May 1797 for practicing (in the words of his colleagues) "delusive quackery" (apologists claimed this expulsion was a coup carried out in the absence of members sympathetic to Perkins). In addition to the opprobrious claim that Perkinism had been "gleaned up from the miserable remnants of animal magnetism," it was the charge of 
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association between Tractoration and Galvanism with particular zeal: "During all this time we conversed upon the discoveries of FRANKLIN and GALVANI, laying much stress upon the power of metallick points attracting even lightning, and conveying it to the earth harmless." The tests were, above all, a theatrical satirization of the Tractors and their advocates, portraying them as fraudulent and, equally important, subjecting them to ridicule and laughter. "To a more curious farce I never was witness; we were almost afraid to look each other in the face, lest an involuntary smile should remove the mask from our countenances, and dispel the charm. But to return to my patient:-In one minute, he felt a smarting in his loins. . . ." In identifying the imagination as the occult and illicit agent of Tractoration-the same charge made by the report of the Franklin Commission on Mesmerism more than a decade earlierHaygarth's and Smith's performances lent the Tractors that aspect of conspicuous theatricality that Perkinists had so scrupulously avoided. When put on display in this manner, the commonsensical facts about Tractoration could be rewitnessed as "marvellous" and "astonishing" effects that owed more to the "wonderful and powerful influence of the passions of the mind upon the state and disorders of the body" than any physical influence proceeding from the metallic rods.47
True to ideological form, Benjamin Perkins attempted, in turn, to rewrite anti-Perkinism as an elitist attack on the ability of the public to make judgments about useful technologies. Whereas Haygarth had been concerned lest respectable citizens unwittingly endorse quacks, the satirist John Corry openly derided the affluence of Perkinism's hypochondriac London patrons, who imagined themselves "indisposed when only labouring under the torpor of indolence." Perkins, however, claimed a public transparency of practice that the trials with wooden Tractors lacked, conducted as the latter were behind closed doors. It was in these private settings that anti-Perkinists had used "terror and awe" to contort "the minds of the credulous patients," some of whom they had "almost frightened to death." In asserting that Tractors were a fraud, anti-Perkinists had insulted "the penetration of the public," since thousands believed they had been successfully treated. Indeed, how suddenly to dismiss the testimony of all those convinced they had been cured? How could these physical effects possibly be the work of the imagination? "Can the imagination cure a gout?" Perkins implored. Children, 47 even horses, had been cured "in the presence of many spectators." Surely the work of the imagination could not explain "the cure of an animal of the brute creation"? 48 His benevolent appeal to the public interest notwithstanding, Perkins refused to grant credibility to anti-Perkinist testimony because of the lowly social standing of the subjects involved. Ironically, social status now became an openly avowed criterion for credibility, even for Perkins. Trials conducted at public hospitals were "far less satisfactory than those on persons of respectability in private practice," he now declared, "where the character of the patient, as well as the disease, is better known," contradicting his own demand that all trials with the Tractors should be public, not private. Perkins's anxiety over the Tractors' public status induced him to discuss the class and stage dynamics that Perkinism had always rhetorically ignored. "No declaration of relief from the poor credulous paupers in a hospital, ought to be admitted as evidence in this practice, unless there is a visible proof to the bystander of the alteration," he demanded. Suddenly, in order to regain control over testimony about the efficacy of real Tractors, the mediation of the eyewitness became more reliable than the spontaneous testimony of the experimental subject's body. "To persuade patients of this class to declare, that they are relieved, and even to think so, nothing more is necessary than to impress on their minds a favourable opinion of the remedy, to induce them to believe that thousands have been cured by the same wonderfully efficacious means, and they will be very ready to acknowledge that they begin to feel what others have previously experienced." Here was the "trick which has been played off on Fictitious Tractors, and public hospitals have been sought as the best theatre where such experiments ought to be exhibited." Even at a basic linguistic level, the Tractors' identity was becoming unstable, refashioned as "pieces of stick," "ligneous Tractors," and "wooden skewers." Smith admitted to using pieces of bone, slate pencils, and tobacco pipes at the Bristol Infirmary specifically "to render the trials the more ridiculous." 49 The satirical writer Corry supplied the coup de grace, reinforcing the image of Perkinism as theater. It was no longer the Age of Reason, Corry observed, but the "age of Quackery," in which "miracle-mongers"
